Introduction
The design of inter-firm agreements, particularly in the face of information asymmetry and uncertainty, has been one of the most vibrant areas of theoretical economic inquiry over the past two decades. Yet our empirical understanding about whether these arrangements are designed and work in a manner that is consistent with theory has lagged. This relative neglect reflects the complexity of the arrangements, the difficulty in accessing data, and the challenge of developing clean tests of theoretical predictions.
The determinants of exclusivity in commercial relationships have received extensive theoretical attention, yet there has been little empirical study of exclusivity in high-tech industries. Similarly, the relationship between exclusivity decisions and other features of inter-firm agreements has been relatively neglected. In this paper, we seek to address these gaps. This paper explores the empirical relationship between exclusivity provisions and the use of contingent control rights in alliances between Internet portals and other firms at the outset of the industry. Contingent control rights are provisions that give one of the contracting parties certain prerogatives in specific states of the world. In the agreements we analyze, these states of the world relate to specific measures that provide information about the commercial or technical performance of the alliance. We find that these contingent control rights are important features of many alliance contracts and that there is a robust empirical relationship between exclusivity provisions and the use of contingent control rights.
-2 -Although the literature suggests that the degree to which it is desirable to incorporate contingent control rights in a contract may depend on the degree of exclusivity between the alliance partners, its predictions about this relationship are not entirely clear. One set of predictions is based on the idea that contingent control rights enable a firm to avoid lock-in to a (potentially inferior ex post) supplier. These predictions argue that if firm A commits only to purchase services from firm B, then A values the option to renegotiate the relationship more than if it had made no such commitment. A second set of predictions is generated by the literature that examines the impact of exclusivity on investments in relationship-specific assets. These theories argue that the function of exclusivity function in an alliance contracts is to generate a relative improvement in the weaker party's outside option-thereby making that party more likely to invest in the relationship-specific asset (Roider [2004] , de Meza and Selvaggi [2007] ). Using an incomplete contracting lens, these theories suggest that a commitment from firm A to purchase services only from firm B may also be accompanied by control rights granted to B, which allow it to renegotiate the contract if A does not perform, thereby safeguard's B's investment in the relationship-specific asset. Stated more simply, both exclusivity and contingent control rights are allocated in such a manner as to support investment in relationship-specific assets. 1 Our analysis of the relationship between exclusivity and contingent control rights and yields some support for both sets of predictions. We find strong support for the idea 1 We assume in this argument that the investment in the relationship-specific asset is noncontractible.
that contingent control rights and exclusivity are both allocated to support relationshipspecific investments. Contingent control rights are more likely to be granted to partner firms when they have exclusive arrangements with portals, and these rights are more likely to be granted to portals when they have exclusive arrangements with partners. We find some support for the lock-in hypothesis as well. Partner firms seem more likely to seek contingent control rights when they have committed to an exclusive arrangement with the portal firm, although the converse does not hold. Further, our analysis of the degree to which the use of contingent control rights changes over time suggest additional support for the lock-in hypothesis, although other interpretations are possible.
Our sample of over one hundred alliance contracts between internet portals and their partner firms is particularly well-suited for this analysis. The contracts we examine exhibit unidirectional exclusivity restrictions for both upstream and downstream firms as well as contingent control rights that may be granted to either party in the agreement.
These contracts also vary significantly in timing, allowing us to assess the degree to which environmental uncertainty plays a role in the use of contingent control rights.
Moreover, portal alliance contracts offer a particularly attractive empirical testing ground for three reasons:
• First is the large number and heterogeneous nature of the contracts. Hundreds of consumer-oriented Internet companies went public during the second half of the 1990s. Many of these completed IPOs while still in their formative stages. Many incumbent companies also launched Internet initiatives. As a result, the -4 -contracting parties ranged from well-established corporations to very young entities.
• Second, the standards for disclosure in this industry have been high. Publicly traded entities are required to file all "material" contracts. Due to the relatively limited revenues of many portals and other Internet concerns and the significant impact that announcements concerning alliances have had on these firms' share prices, the disclosure of agreements during this period was extensive. While firms could request confidential treatment for portions of the alliance agreements, their failure to disclose might become an issue if the firm was subsequently subject to shareholder litigation.
• The final attractive aspect is the mapping between the contracts themselves and economic theory. These agreements carefully delineated ownership, exclusivity, and other provisions that have typically been examined in the theoretical depictions of contracting. In Elfenbein and Lerner [2003] , we argued that in the early years of the industry, the uncertainty surrounding the environment in which portals and partner firms contracted suggested that problems of non-contractibility were likely to exert powerful forces on the structure of contracts. Indeed, in this environment, the allocation of an observable subset of alliance assets were allocated as suggested by the property rights theory of Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore [1988] , although the relationship between ownership, control rights, and payment terms suggested that contracting in this setting was more complicated than existing theories lead us to believe.
-5 -There is a relatively modest body of empirical literature directly related to this paper. Lafontaine and Slade [2008] summarize the findings of a variety of prior empirical studies of exclusivity that focus primarily on the consequences of exclusivity in competitive markets. Mathewson and Winter [1994] report on the relationship between territorial exclusivity and other attributes of franchise contracts such as operating restraints and contract length. Azoulay and Shane [2001] find that new franchise chains that adopt exclusive territories are more likely to survive than those that do not. In work that is closer to this paper, Hall [1991] examined nearly 100 contracts across a spectrum of high-technology industries. The analysis sought to test predictions from his model, which had hypothesized relationships between the exclusivity of the agreement, the strength of intellectual property rights, and the use of royalties. Anand and Khanna [2000] report the incidence of exclusivity in a large cross-industry sample of technology licensing contracts and find that the use of exclusivity provisions varies widely across industries and depends on the stage of development of the technology. More broadly, this paper seeks to contribute to the empirical literature examining the impact of firm and environmental characteristics on the governance structure of alliances contracts (e.g., Lerner and Merges [1998] , Elfenbein and Lerner [2003] , Lerner, Shane, and Tsai [2003] , Higgins [2007] , and Robinson and Stuart [2007a, 2007b] , Ryall and Sampson [2009] , Lerner and Malmandier [forthcoming] ) and of other inter-firm relationships such as franchising (e.g., Arrunada, Garicano, and Vazquez [2001] ).
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the prior research relating to the presence of exclusivity and contingent control rights. In Section 3, we -6 -provide a brief overview of Internet portals and the alliances into which they enter. In Section 4, we discuss the structure of the alliance contracts. We describe the creation of the data set in Section 5. Section 6 presents the analyses, and the final section concludes the paper.
Theory
Three related streams of literature suggest a relationship between exclusivity and contingent control rights in generating appropriate incentives for investment. The first is the literature that formally addresses the degree to which exclusivity addresses problems stemming from incomplete information and incomplete contracts.
A second, complementary line of research addresses a similar set of issues and highlights the important role played by of control rights, which typically safeguard one party in "bad" states of the world. A final, less formal, literature focuses on the degree to which relationships both support and impede effective partnerships with implications both for the use of exclusivity provisions in designing alliance contracts and for contingent control rights. We explore this literature in greater detail below.
A. Exclusivity
A broad theoretical literature examines the determinants of exclusivity between trading partners. Treatments of exclusivity in the technology licensing typically assume that final output is contractible and that the licensor has an essential input of uncertain value. These treatments focus on the interaction between payment terms and exclusivity decisions in shaping downstream markets (Kamien and Tauman [1986] ) and in addressing moral hazard problems by licensors (Gallini and Wright [1990] ) and licensees (Hall [1991] Gal-Or [1991] ), and may depend in part on the degree of product differentiation (Martimort [1996] ). Bernheim and Whinston [1998] show that "exclusive dealing can serve as a device for extracting rents from markets other than the ones in which they are employed … [i.e.,] when retail markets develop sequentially and in which manufacturers must serve more than one market to achieve important economies (p67)." Taken together this suggests that exclusivity decisions depends on the degree of substitutability of rival producers' products, the information advantage held by retailers over the producers, and the degree to which producers average costs overall may depend on sales in a particular market.
2 Common agency is the situation in which a single retailer in a given territory sells the product of multiple manufacturers in a given product category or in which multiple retailers sell the products of multiple manufacturers. Exclusive dealing involves two-way exclusivity in which a manufacturer partners with one and only one retailer in a given territory.
Other scholars have focused in the role that exclusivity plays in facilitating Building on a property-rights framework, Roider explores the optimal structure of an inter-firm agreement when output is partially contractible. In this model, two firms decide who should own the productive asset, the quantity of trade that occurs between the two parties, and whether the parties may trade externally or not, i.e., whether they have an exclusive arrangement. Residual control rights provide incentives only when external trade is permitted. Similar to deMeza and Selvaggi [2007] , in Roider's model, exclusivity is an equilibrium outcome when the differences in bargaining power (threat points) between parties involved in the exchange is extreme, and when high levels of output are specified. Exclusivity is not, however, a unique equilibrium in this model.
B. Contingent Control Rights
While the incomplete contracting perspective has generated important insights about the role of exclusivity in inter-firm agreements, as discussed above, it has also proven to be a fruitful framework for understanding the boundaries of organizations and the design of relationships between firms more generally. Economic theory has taken an increasing interest in understanding the sources of contractual incompleteness. One approach, typified by Williamson [1985] is to examine the trade-off between the need for ex post adaptation of contractual arrangements and the ex ante costs of writing increasingly complete contracts. Bajari and Tadelis [2001] offer one formalized approach to exploring this tradeoff in the context of procurement contracts. In their model, incorporating more potential future states of the world into the contract comes at increasing cost. The value of incorporating these contingencies depends on other incentives provided to a supplier and the complexity of the project to be supplied.
Although in our setting we examine the use of standard state contingent provisions which should not increase the cost of drafting a contract substantially, a key concern may be that these control rights may be ex post inefficient if they direct parties toward actions that turn out to have distant relationship to the ability of the partnership to generate value.
A separate set of insights into the question of contractual incompletenesshighlighting the role of contingent control rights-stems from the security design literature (e.g., Aghion and Bolton [1992] and Dewatripont and Tirole [1994] ). This literature examines how the choice of equity vs. debt financing impacts the incentives of financiers and entrepreneurs through the creation of differing profiles of control rights in different states of the world. Aghion and Bolton [1992] for instance, find that even in a setting where it is efficient to grant control to the entrepreneur, he may need to relinquish control to an investor in order to induce the financier to invest in the first place. A second set of insights has been generated by principle-agent theories that explicitly consider the relationship between the structure of the information asymmetry between two parties and their decision to allocate control rights. Dessein [2002] , for example, suggests that allocating more control rights to better-informed parties reduces information distortion, whereas Aghion and Tirole [1997] suggest that providing better-informed -11 -parties with more control rights provides the right incentives for information acquisition.
Dessein [2005] explores these questions in the context of strategic alliances. He depicts a setting where, if no information problems were present, the firm making the critical technological contribution to the project would retain complete control over the project (i.e., interference by the other party reduces the total surplus). But because the innovating firm has private information about its quality or the congruence of its incentives with the other firm, it will signal this to its partner by providing the other firm with some control rights. This step is not too costly for a high quality firm or a firm with highly congruent preferences, which knows that the information received by the other party is likely to be favorable, but can be costly for a low quality firm or a firm that has different preferences than its partner.
This model highlights an important potential connection between exclusivity and the use of contingent control rights. Although Dessein [2005] focuses on the degree to which a single party receives private benefits from shirking, in many relationships both parties may have incentives to undertake unobservable actions that are privately (but not jointly) optimal. Moreover, one party in the relationship may be more vulnerable to holdup than another. In these cases, the vulnerable party may be more likely to seek contingent control rights to reduce the severity of the potential hold-up. Thus, if granted, contingent control rights may provide improved incentives for the vulnerable party to make relationship-specific investments, and may also serve a screening function when there is private information about partners' intentions (i.e., its propensity to hold up).
-12 -These same considerations in models such as those of de Meza and Selvaggi [2007] lead the vulnerable firm to be granted exclusivity, as well.
While contingent control rights may be allocated to protect a vulnerable party from hold-up (or to screen out potentially incompatible partners), they may also be desirable to preserve a firm's options in an environment of high uncertainty. When the a priori value of a relationship is uncertain, one or both parties may wish to have the right to renegotiate or exit the arrangement. This can be of particular value when supplier (or buyer) capabilities and strategies are shifting rapidly (Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger [2008] ), as they were in the early stages of the Internet industry. While "spotoutsourcing" (Baker, Gibbons, Murphy [2002] ) may offer one alternative governance structure in this setting, the need for relationship-specific investments to be made raises he likelihood that long-term contracts will be signed (Joskow [1989] ). Conditional on signing long-term contracts, the greater the uncertainty in value of the agreement or the ability of the partner firm, the more likely parties are to seek to include unilateral rights to renegotiate the contract to avoid lock-in to a firm whose relative capabilities turn out to be superseded by another.
4
These considerations are exacerbated by exclusivity restrictions, which make bad states of nature more consequential. A firm that is contractually prohibited from dealing with alternative partners is likely to desire contingent control rights more than had it not signed an exclusive contract.
In summary, one view of the relationship between exclusivity and contingent control rights suggests that when relationship-specific investments are important and parties have asymmetric vulnerability to ex post hold-up, granting the weaker party exclusivity and contingent control rights both improve that party's incentives to invest in the relationship, and hence may be found together. A second, complementary view suggests that the party granting exclusivity (whether to provide incentives for relationship-specific investment or for other reasons) may seek contingent control rights to avoid being locked-in to dealing with a partner who turns out ex post to be suboptimal. Additionally, this view suggests that contingent control rights will be more likely to be sought when environmental uncertainty-in particular, uncertainty about whether the partner or the match will be effective-is high.
Portals and Portal Alliances in the Early Evolution of the Internet
Portals-which can be defined as Internet sites that provide (directly or indirectly) enabling users to locate web sites on certain topics or featuring specific phrases. Many portals were new entrants, some were producers of browser software (e.g., Netscape), and still others had previously operated proprietary on-line services (for instance, America
Online). Although subscribers to these proprietary services initially had access only to the features developed for the service itself, these firms increasingly began providing
Internet access and created portals of their own. Beginning in 1997, portals began adding a broad array of materials to their sites. These included content, such as stock prices and news headlines, as well as services, such as on-line auctions and personal e-mail. The basic services were typically available for free. Portals generated revenues principally through the sale of banner and sponsorship advertisements. Many portals also sought to diversify their revenue bases with transaction fees from merchandise sold on their sites by strategic partners and through other means; however, during this period, these strategies met with limited success.
Alliances could benefit a portal in two ways. First, in exchange for advertisements, promotions, and other services, the portal frequently received direct compensation. Second, the agreements may have increased the appeal of the portal's site by deepening its content and extending its features.
5
5 The appeal of a portal's web site can be measured in at least two different ways. The first is a measure called reach. This is the total number of unique visitors to a web site divided by the total number of all Internet users in a given period. The top Internet portal, Yahoo!, was visited by more than half of all Internet users in July 2001. The second type of measurement is of how many pages that the average user examines on the site. Also, it should be noted that the product of these two measures (i.e., the unique audience multiplied by the number of pages viewed per person) is a good proxy for the number of advertising opportunities for the firm during the period in question. Alliances were also useful for the partner firms, be they content, service, or technology providers. Many Internet sites struggled during this period to acquire a sufficient user base. In many segments of the Internet industry, analysts predicted that there would be a substantial shake-out, in which only one or two leading firms would survive and emerge as profitable. Portal alliances were one method of attracting users.
Alliances also often permitted partners to rapidly test their business models and to acquire customer data. Even if they were executed on relatively unattractive terms, alliances could thus be beneficial for the partners as well.
The patterns of alliance formation provide some evidence that alliances were indeed thought to be critical to the strategies of many Internet portals and their alliance partners. America Online / Netscape, Yahoo, Lycos, Excite, and Microsoft-the firms with the strongest positions in the industry-were the firms most involved in alliance formation (Elfenbein [2004] ).
Alliance Contracts
The alliance agreements themselves were, in general, complex and varied considerably in their structure, even within the same industry category. Consider the following two examples:
In December 1998, Autoweb.com, which operated a site that allowed users to research new automobiles and to purchase them online, entered into a 13-month advertising and promotion agreement with Yahoo! Inc. The agreement specified the types and placements of Autoweb.com links on the Yahoo site, including banner and button placement, a link allowing users to search Autoweb's site, and links within Yahoo's auto classifieds service. Yahoo, for its part, would be solely responsible for the user interface and graphic display of Autoweb links. Limited exclusivity provisions were built into the agreement. The contract prohibited Autoweb from displaying any links to
Yahoo's competitors on its front page. Yahoo, in turn, was prohibited from including graphic links to more than three other auto merchants, and was prohibited from displaying banner advertisements from any competitor on specified pages. Payment and performance provisions were also specified. The contract detailed the number of impressions 6 that Yahoo was to deliver (by type of advertisement); it granted Autoweb access to a database where these impressions would be calculated; and it described the contingencies that would result should Yahoo fail to deliver the required number of impressions during the term of the agreement. In addition, the contract loosely specified some technical performance targets for Autoweb. As compensation, Yahoo received a fixed slotting fee and a referral fee for each click-through In return for these links, Autobytel paid a fixed fee and would pay an additional transaction-based royalty for each purchase request over a specified number submitted by Lycos' customers on the Autobytel site. 9 To ensure compliance, each firm was given audit rights to examine the others' records. Autobytel retained rights to all customer data, but agreed to provide aggregated customer profile data for Lycos.
8 Autobytel.com announced that it would merge with Autoweb in April, 2001. 9 The number of impressions and the magnitude of the fees were redacted from the publicly filed versions of both contracts.
As the examples above suggest, there was a great deal of heterogeneity in the alliances that portals entered into. In Elfenbein and Lerner [2003] we focus on the allocation of asset ownership and control rights. In this paper, we focus on the use of exclusivity restrictions and performance guarantees that grant one party or the other certain control rights in specific states of the world.
Data

A. Constructing the Dataset
To undertake the analysis, we identified a set of 106 contracts between portals and other firms entered into between 1995 and 1999. These contracts were identified primarily from Recap/IT, a consulting firm that maintains a database of contracts For our analysis, we selected a random sample of 106 alliances from this database. We sought to create a population that avoided undesirable heterogeneity. In particular, we eliminated alliances where:
• One of the parties was non-profit organization.
• One of the parties had a controlling interest in the other, either through a majority equity stake or through a purchase option.
• The two parties had a previous alliance covering the same set of technologies, and consequently were renegotiating the terms of an earlier alliance.
We reviewed these documents carefully to identify the key features of these agreements. After considerable experimentation, we developed a coding form that captured the key features of these alliances. In many cases, firms filed multiple copies of the same documents with the SEC. In these cases, different versions of the documents were reviewed to insure that information that was redacted in one version was not included in another.
We also gathered two types of supplemental information. First, to assess the financial health of the contracting parties, we examined the Compustat and Worldscope databases for the end of the fiscal quarter immediately prior to the alliance. For firms where this information was not available from Compustat or Worldscope, we gathered the information from 10-K filings, IPO prospectuses, and other securities filings.
Second, we employed information from an Internet and on-line usage tracking service, Media Metrix (formerly known as PC Meter), which has compiled information from the earliest days of the industry. 10 For each of the two contracting parties, we assessed their Internet properties' "reach"-the percentage of all U.S. users who accessed the site at least once in a given month-and the total number of days and minutes that the average accessing user viewed the site in that month. In making these calculations, we compiled all properties owned by the contracting firm: for instance, the usage data for an alliance signed by Disney in 1999 would include information about visits to ABC.com.
B. Measuring Exclusivity
As a practical matter, the types of exclusivity that we observe in these contracts differ somewhat from the types of exclusivity that theory leads us to expect. In particular, we observe a number of types of exclusivity provisions that place restrictions on both the upstream and downstream parties. By contrast, the technology licensing 10 Media Metrix determined usage by examining the activity of a representative panel of Internet users. The size of the panel and accuracy of the measures has increased over time. We used data on U.S. users only: while in recent years, Media Metrix has introduced statistics on non-U.S. Internet usage, these were not available for the entire period. During the period under study, U.S. users had a dominant presence at most commercial Internet sites.
literature typically focuses only on constraints that bind upstream parties and the literature exclusive dealing focuses mainly on constraints that bind downstream parties.
The bargaining literature examines some bilateral restrictions, but unlike the contracts we study, it analyzes exclusive contracts as being completely restrictive. In our data, there are numerous exclusivity restrictions, suggesting a continuous rather than absolute conceptualization of exclusivity. Table 1 examines the exclusivity restrictions associated with the sample contracts.
Panels A and B focus on exclusivity obligations restricting the actions of portals and partners, respectively. For both portals and partners, we examined seven different types of exclusivity obligations, which are listed in the left hand column of the table.
11 11 For portals we examined whether the portal was restricted from entering into any or more than a set number of agreements with competitors; from advertising competitors anywhere on the site, in specific areas of the site, or on a continuous basis; from establishing any links to competitors' sites; and from granting the use of certain keywords or search terms to other firms. We similarly analyzed whether the partner was restricted from entering into any agreement with a competitor or agreements with competitors involving specific content; from advertising competitors anywhere on its site, in specific areas, or on a continuous basis; from promoting competitors more prominently than the portal; or from establishing any links to competitors' sites. In all cases, +1 denoted a case where this exclusivity provision was present and 0 where it was absent.
In both cases, these seven exclusivity obligations were divided into two categories, those that related to establishing other alliances with competitors and those that related to restrictions on advertising competitors. Some restrictions clearly subsumed others. For example, restricting a party from advertising a competitor anywhere on the co-party's site clearly prohibited them from advertising a competitor on a particular section of its site.
Therefore, in generating composite measures of the exclusivity of the agreements, some terms were given larger weights than others. These weights are listed in the second -22 -column to the left. The results that follow are robust to several other weighting schemes, including the simple scheme in which each provision is given equal weight.
As Panel A shows, 40.5 percent of the alliance agreements restricted the portals from signing an alliance with any of the partner's competitors, and 8.5 percent of the agreements restricted the total number of alliances that portals could sign with partners in a given category. Roughly one-quarter of the time, portals assigned keywords uniquely to the partner firm. Overall, the portal's ability to sign agreements with the partner's competitors was at least somewhat restricted in 61.3 percent of the contracts.
Restrictions on portals' advertising behavior were present somewhat less frequently. At least some restriction on the portal's ability to advertise competitors was present in 46.2 percent of the contracts.
Panel B examines the exclusivity obligations for partners. Generally, agreements contained fewer exclusivity obligations for partners than for the portals. In 15 percent of the cases, partners were prohibited from signing (any or particular) alliances with the portal's competitors. Restriction on the partners' advertising was somewhat more frequent. In 32.1 percent of alliance contracts, there was at least one of this type of restriction.
C. Measuring Contingent Control Rights
We examined the use of two types of contingent control rights that could be included in alliance contracts. The first set of terms related to technical performance and could be granted to the portal. These terms included the speed with which the partner's pages loaded, the percentage of time the website was available, the level of customer service, and the competitive ranking by specified third parties (e.g., a trade magazine) of the site relative to its peers. The second set of terms related to the minimum level of commercial activity that the site, content, or service covered by the agreement needed to reach and could be granted to the partner. Targets included a minimum number of user impressions that the site would garner (whether all impressions or those of some targeted subset of users), "click-throughs" into another area, revenues, or new customers. In case these levels were not reached, the contract stipulated that the agreement be typically terminated or renegotiated. These variables were recorded as +1 if the provision was present and 0 otherwise. Table 2 summarizes the incidence of each of these performance measures in the alliance contracts. Panel A examines the use of technical contingencies in the contract, and Panel B examines the use of market-related contingencies. The median agreement contracted on no technical contingencies and one market-related contingency. In both cases, the average contract contained less than one of each type of contingency. Table   A1 in the appendix presents a number of examples relating to the technical execution of portal alliances. Table 3 summarizes the sample of agreements used in this analysis. Panel A summarizes the relative effort required in the alliance. We examined five activities that -24 -frequently were required after the agreement was signed: the development of material for the site (whether content, services, or technology), the maintenance and hosting of the site, the provision of customer service, order fulfillment, and billing. We coded these as +1 if the portal was required to make the greater effort on this dimension, -1 if the partner was required to do so, and 0 if the effort was jointly shared or not required by the agreement. While the sum of these five effort measures ranged from +5 to -5, in most cases, the bulk of the post-agreement effort was required of the partner.
D. Control Variables
Panel B presents the traffic on Internet sites of the two parties in the month before the signing of the agreement. Not surprisingly, portals' sites were visited by more users, more frequently, and for longer than partners' sites. In the ensuing analysis, we use the relative site visitation data as our proxy for the value of the partner's technology. Our assumption is that the higher the traffic on the partner's web site (relative to that of the portal), the more valuable is the partner's technology.
Panel C considers the relative financial health of the two parties. There was a great deal of variation, which reflected the fact that we examined the financial health of the entire corporate entity if it had 100% ownership of the contracting firm. For instance, in a transaction involving Snap.com, the financial information of its parent, General Electric, was recorded.
Panel D provides information about the level of industry development at the time at which the contract was signed. In the sample of 106 alliance contracts, 67 different -25 -partner firms were represented. Of these, 63 firms fell into 26 distinct segments of the Internet industry and four were categorized as "traditional" firms. These industry segments, the public firms that composed them, and the date of these firms' IPOs are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. The "traditional" category was assumed to begin at the same time as the earliest IPO among all firms in Table A2 , December 15, 1994. 12 As Panel D shows, more than half of the contracts in our sample were signed before the first IPO in the industry segment of the partner. Contracts were signed up to 2 years before this watershed date and up to 4.5 years after the date. We interpret the difference (in days) between the contract date and the date of the first IPO in the partner category as the maturity of the industry segment at the time of contracting.
Analysis
We start by analyzing the correlation between the use of contingent control rights, exclusivity, and other attributes of the contracting firm and contracting environment at the time of the agreement. Table 4 The empirical challenge of incorporating exclusivity into the regressions of contingent control rights is the standard one. Because contingent control rights and exclusivity are negotiated simultaneously as part of a single contract, the most that one can infer from a statistically significant relationship between these two measures of contract structure is a correlation in the data.
We separately examine contingent control rights granted to the partner (market contingencies) and contingent control rights granted to the portal (technical contingencies). In each regression we look at the relationship between these contingent control rights and exclusivity provisions that bind both parties. If exclusivity provisions serve to raise the value of an option to renegotiate, then we would expect β 1 to be greater than zero when the dependent variable is market contingencies and β 2 to be greater than zero when the dependent variable is technical contingencies. If exclusivity provisions generate incentives to invest in the presence of hold-up opportunities, then we would expect β 2 to be greater than zero when the dependent variable is market contingencies and β 1 to be greater than zero when the dependent variable is market contingencies. To the degree that options to renegotiate become more valuable the greater the environmental uncertainty, we expect γ to be less than zero.
In Table 5 , we present the results of an ordered logit regression incorporating raw exclusivity measures. In Table 6 , we replace exclusivity measures with residuals from first stage regressions, which predict the levels of exclusivity. 14 These residuals are the component of exclusivity that is unexplained by structural features of the relationship and other features of the contract. In unreported regressions, we employ a simultaneous equations approach, in which we model contingent control rights and exclusivity restrictions (both for the portal and for the partner firm) as being chosen simultaneously.
The results of these three-stage least squares estimations corroborate those displayed in Tables 6 and 7 , as the coefficients are of the same sign and magnitude as in the OLS analogs to the reported regressions. In most cases, these coefficients are significant as well.
This analysis produces two main results. First, there is a robust statistical link between exclusivity restrictions on the partner and the use of market contingencies. This result provides support for the hypothesis that exclusivity raises the value of contingent 14 First-stage R 2 values are .18 and .11 for partner restrictions and portal restrictions, respectively. control rights. We cannot explain, however, why the same pattern is not present for portal alliances. One possibility is that portals expected to be in numerous lines of business simultaneously, and could therefore better afford to have an exclusive arrangement underperform than a partner firm whose main connection to the marketplace might be the portal. Second, there is a positive link between exclusivity restrictions on the partner and the use of technical contingencies, and a robust statistical link between exclusivity restrictions on the portal and the use of market contingencies. This suggests that exclusivity restrictions and the use of contingencies may be included in the contracts based upon potential hold-up considerations that result from the underlying activities of the alliance or attributes of the partners themselves. Overall, the results are suggestive that contingent control rights and exclusivity provisions are found in tandem in the face of potential hold-up problems. Whether they do so because they have complementary function, or reflect signaling in games of imperfect information, remains to be resolved in future work.
Robustness
One potential problem with analyzing state-contingent control rights is that not all of these rights are equal. Some contingencies may cover more states of nature than others, and these provisions vary in strength. Thus, the probability-weighted likelihood that an actual transfer of control occurs will vary with the type of control right and the individual contract. While we have no empirical strategy to deal with the second of these issues, we can address with the first concern-that some control rights cover more states of nature than others-by examining the contingencies separately using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach. To complement each of the regression analyses reported below, we undertake unreported additional analyses using a non-linear (logit) SUR to examine the allocation of individual contingencies. In all cases, the coefficients of the variables of interest estimated using the SUR procedure were of similar sign and jointly significant at levels equivalent to those estimated using the composite measures.
In addition, we explore the degree to which our results are specific to the specific measures of contingent control rights that we use. In testing the theory above, we have assumed that all market contingencies are granted to the partner firm and all technical contingencies are granted to the portal. While the technical contingencies are contingent control rights that may only be allocated to the portal firm and market contingencies are generally allocated to the partner firm, some market contingencies may be allocated to the portal firm or to both firms. In particular, portal firms may be granted control rights if minimum revenue targets are not met. We repeat the analysis, excluding minimum revenue targets from the measure of contingencies granted to the partner firm. The resulting regressions have the same character as those displayed in Tables 5 and 6 . There continues to be a large and positive correlation between contingent control rights granted to the partner and portal exclusivity restrictions. These coefficients continue to be significant with p-values of less than .01. The positive correlation between contingent control rights granted to the partner and partner exclusivity also continues to be positive; however, these estimates are at the border of significance, with p-values ranging from .074 to .275.
Conclusion
Despite the desirability of testing the various theoretical depictions of inter-firm agreements-not to mention the important role that alliances and licensing play in many high-technology industries-the structure of these agreements has attracted surprisingly little empirical attention. To assess this gap, we employ a sample of over 100 alliances involving Internet portals. In this paper, we have sought to understand the relationship between the presence of exclusivity provisions and the use contingent control rights in an environment in which relationship-specific investments are important and in which the ex ante knowledge of counterparty's capabilities was highly uncertain. Although the roles played by exclusivity and contingent control rights in generating appropriate incentives for investment have each individually received attention in the theoretical literature, there has been little discussion of their interaction. We hope that this work highlights potential future avenues of inquiry in this area.
We find that parties include more state-contingent control rights in contracts when more exclusivity restrictions are present. In particular, more contingent control rights are granted to partner firms the more exclusivity binds either party, and more contingent control rights are granted to portals when partners sign exclusive contracts. Parties also include more performance measures in contracts when environmental uncertainty is greater; as industry segments mature, these provisions tend to be dropped. The patterns of correlation between contingent control rights and exclusivity are partially consistent with theories of avoiding lock-in, and of supporting relationship-specific investment in the face of potential hold-up problems. These results may also be interpreted as offering -31 -support for "control theory" models such as Dessein [2005] . The value of granting statecontingent control rights in solving adverse selection problems may be higher when the performance measurements upon which they are based are noisy. Moreover, they may also serve a more beneficial purpose by screening when incentive compatibility (or fear of hold-up) is more likely to be a severe problem.
We end with a firm conviction that considerable opportunities exist for further empirical research into these issues. Of particular interest is the question of understanding the extent to which the patterns seen here generalize across industries. Table 3 Summary Statistics for Control Variables. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. Observations are summarized by the date of the agreement, the effort required of the portal and partner (cases where the portal is expected to make the greatest effort are coded as +1, those where the partner is as -1, and those where the effort is shared or not applicable are coded as 0), the traffic on the portal and the partner's Internet properties in the month before the signing of the contract, and the financial position of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract (in millions of dollars). Table 4 Correlation between measures of contractual contingencies, timing of agreement, and industry maturity. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. Market contingencies and technical contingencies are the sum of the five and four individual provisions described in Table 2 . Portal restrictions are the "total portal restriction" measured in Table 2 Panel A and Partner restrictions are the "total partner restriction" measure in Table  2 Panel B. Other variables include the year of the agreement, the maturity of the partner's industry segment (measured as days since the first IPO in the segment), the relative effort required of the portal and partner after the alliance signing on five key dimensions (with those where the most effort is required of the portal coded as -5 and the most effort by the portal as +5), the relative reach of the portal and the partner in the month before the signing of the contract (+1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater reach, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases), and the relative sales of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract (+1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater sales, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases), the commercial focus of the agreement (either content, product sales, technology / service, or some combination of these three categories). p-values for individual correlations are in brackets. Dashes represent self-correlations, which are omitted. Maturity is the difference between the date on which the contract was signed and the date of the first IPO in the industry subcategory of the partner firm. Table 5 Ordered logit regression analyses of the relationship of contingencies and exclusivity in portal alliances. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. The dependent variables are the sums of five measures of the contingencies in the contract relating to product market performance (+1 denoted a case where this contractual element was present and 0 a case where it was absent) and four relating to technical performance. Independent variables include the maturity of the partner's industry segment (measured as days since the first IPO in the segment), of the measure of exclusivity restrictions on the partner and portal, the commercial focus of the agreement (either content, product sales, technology / service, or some combination of these three categories), the year of the agreement, the relative effort required of the portal and partner after the alliance signing on five key dimensions (with those where the most effort is required of the portal coded as -5 and the most effort by the portal as +5), the relative reach of the portal and the partner in the month before the signing of the contract (in most regressions, +1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater reach, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases), and the relative sales of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract (+1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater sales, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases .173 a Coefficients in this row have been multiplied by 100. *** = significant at the 1% confidence level (two-sided test), ** = significant at the 5% confidence level (two-sided test), * = significant at the 10% confidence level (two-sided test) Table 6 Ordered logit regression analyses of the relationship of contingencies and exclusivity in portal alliances. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. The dependent variables are the sums of five measures of the contingencies in the contract relating to product market performance (+1 denoted a case where this contractual element was present and 0 a case where it was absent) and four relating to technical performance. Independent variables include the maturity of the partner's industry segment (measured as days since the first IPO in the segment), the count of the number of exclusivity restrictions on the partner and portal, the commercial focus of the agreement (either content, product sales, technology / service, or some combination of these three categories), the year of the agreement, the relative effort required of the portal and partner after the alliance signing on five key dimensions (with those where the most effort is required of the portal coded as -5 and the most effort by the portal as +5), the relative reach of the portal and the partner in the month before the signing of the contract (in most regressions, +1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater reach, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases), and the relative sales of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract (+1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater sales, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases). Two regressions include controls for the type of the agreement and the portals entering into the agreements (not reported). Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in brackets. .179 a Coefficients in this row have been multiplied by 100. *** = significant at the 1% confidence level (two-sided test), ** = significant at the 5% confidence level (two-sided test), * = significant at the 10% confidence level (two-sided test) Table A1 Examples of performance-based contingent control rights in portal alliance contracts. The table below contains excerpts from selected contracts.
Source Contract
Text Yahoo-Autoweb 6.4
The Autoweb Site shall comply with the scale, speed and performance requirements mutually agreed upon by the parties but in no event less than that provided by the Yahoo Main Site.
AOL-1800 Flowers
3. SPEED; ACCESSIBILITY. 1-800-Flowers will ensure that the performance and availability of the Affiliated 1-800-Flowers Site (a) is monitored on a continuous, 24/7 basis and (b) remains competitive in all material respects with the performance and availability of other similar sites based on similar form technology. 1-800-Flowers will use commercially reasonable to ensure that: (a) the functionality and features within the Affiliated 1-800-Flowers Site are optimized for the client software then in use by AOL Users; and (b) the Affiliated 1-800-Flowers Site is designed and populated in a manner that minimizes delays when AOL Users attempt to access such site.
5
. SERVICE LEVEL RESPONSE. 1-800-Flowers agrees to use commercially reasonable efforts to provide the following service levels in response to problems with or improvements to the Affiliated 1-800-Flowers Site:
• For material functions of software that are or have become substantially inoperable, 1-800-Flowers will provide a bug fix or workaround within two (2) business days after the first report of such error.
•
For functions of the software that are impaired or otherwise fail to operate in accordance with agreed upon specifications, 1-800-Flowers will provide a bug fix or workaround within three (3) business days after the first report of such error.
For errors disabling only certain non-essential functions, 1-800-Flowers will provide a bug fix or workaround within sixty (60) days after the first report of such error.
Yahoo -American Greetings
3.2 (c) American Greetings shall operate and maintain the American Greetings Site to be one of the top [] a sites for the on-line provision of Greetings (as determined, to the extent practical, over a reasonable period of time, by an independent, qualified and industry-recognized third party based on the quantity and quality of customers and product offerings).
a The actual number was redacted from the contract disclosed to investors. Note: Both the Yahoo-Autoweb and AOL-1-800-Flowers.com contracts specify performance requirements such as speed and availability (or uptime) for the partners' website. The AOL-1-800-Flowers.com contract also specifies certain customer service requirements for the partner firm. Finally, the Yahoo-American Greetings contract specifies that American Greetings remain among the top websites in its category as determined by and independent third party. In the contracts above, Autoweb, 1-800-Flowers.com, and American Greetings are the partner firms. 
